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The Executive Branch Shall Construe: The 
Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and the 
Presidential Signing Statement* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In late April of 2004, 60 Minutes II sparked national outrage when it 
aired a story revealing photographs of American soldiers subjecting 
detainees at Iraqs Abu Ghraib prison to appallingly abusive treatment.1  
This scandal served as at least partial catalyst for Senator John McCain, 
himself a victim of torture while a prisoner of war in North Vietnam, to 
propose legislation categorically forbidding future conduct of this sort.2  
In December of 2005, President George W. Bush signed into law the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, otherwise known as the McCain 
Amendment, which prohibits the cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment of anyone in U.S. custody, regardless of 
geographic location.3  The Act passed the Senate by a vote of 90-9, and 
was seen by human rights activists as a victory for the rule of law and 
a step toward healing the nations damaged reputation in the eyes of the 
world.4 
However, it soon came to light that President Bush had issued a 
statement contemporaneously with the signing of the bill.  In it, Bush 
declared that [t]he Executive branch shall construe the prohibition in 
a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to 
supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and 
consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power in 
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 1. Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed, CBSNEWS.COM, Apr. 28, 2004, http://www. 
cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml. 
 2. See Richard Cohen, Op-Ed., We Dont Want a Hanoi Hilton, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2005, at 
A27 (discussing a visit to the North Vietnamese prison known as the Hanoi Hilton where McCain 
was held during his five and a half years as a prisoner of war). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2007). 
 4. Rick Klein & Charlie Savage, Bush Accedes to McCain in Backing Ban on Torture, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
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order to protect[] the American people from further terrorist attacks.5  
To many, this signaled that President Bush did not intend to comply with 
the prohibition.6 
This episode remains one of the most controversial of Bushs 
presidency.7  At the time, the presidential practice of issuing statements 
that looked like enforcement disclaimers was largely unheard of in the 
public sphere.  And the idea of the President announcing his intention to 
construe a statute in a manner consistent with some obscure-sounding 
political theory such as the unitary executive seemed also to be 
antithetical to what the public had learned in civics class. 
This Comment will pull the curtain back on the practice of 
presidential signing statements to discover that, despite their dubious 
appearance, they are really inherently innocuous.  Furthermore, this 
Comment will argue that the President is sometimes justified in 
employing what is known as the avoidance canon in order to construe a 
statute to avoid an unconstitutional application, and that the presidential 
signing statement can be a useful vehicle for doing so.  In particular, it 
will argue that careful, comprehensive Executive construction of 
constitutionally troublesome statutes simultaneously protects the 
Executives constitutionally enumerated authorities, respects the role of 
the Legislature in the enactment process, and many times makes final 
judicial review of a constitutional violation possible where it otherwise 
may not be. 
II. THE PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENT 
A presidential signing statement is simply a short document issued 
by the President when he signs a bill into law.8  The majority of signing 
statements issued throughout the history of the presidency have been 
innocuously rhetorical in nature, extolling the virtues of a bill or perhaps 
                                                     
 5. Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 41 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1918, 1919 (Jan. 2, 2006). 
 6. See, e.g., Editorial, Unchecked Abuse, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2006, at A20 (suggesting that 
Mr. Bush is planning to ignore it whenever he chooses). 
 7. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Commentary, Presidential Power Patois?, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2007, at A18 (Mr. Mukasey denounced torture as unconstitutional, but declined to rebuke President 
Bushs signing statement issued in conjunction with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 . . . .); 
William Fisher, Bush: Uniter, Decider, and Now, Interpreter, ANTIWAR.COM, Feb. 6, 2008, http:// 
www.antiwar.com/ips/fisher.php?articleid=12317 (Arguably, the most controversial of Bushs 
signing statements rejected the so-called McCain Amendment . . . .). 
 8. Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 
23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 308 (2006). 
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pointing out its shortcomings.9  These statements amount to little more 
than White House press releases.  Other signing statements are more 
political in nature; they may be intended as a sort of enforcement 
directive to an Executive Branch agency or as an attempt to influence 
later judicial interpretation of the statutes meaning.10  More 
controversially, Presidents have issued signing statements in order to 
express perceived constitutional defects in a bill, ranging from separation 
of powers concerns to individual rights concerns.11  These statements 
may call on Congress to enact corrective legislation, or they may assert 
the authority to decline to execute the challenged provision or to execute 
it in a manner which comports with the Executives interpretation of the 
Constitution.12  Although signing statements may be rhetorical, political, 
or constitutional in nature, this Comment will focus solely on the 
constitutional variety. 
A. Brief History 
Article I, section 7 of the U.S. Constitution provides that when a 
President vetoes a bill, he shall return it, with his Objections to that 
House in which it shall have originated.13  There is no constitutional 
analogue requiring the President to offer any explanation whatsoever 
when he chooses instead to sign a bill into law.14  Yet, Presidents of both 
parties have made extensive use of rhetorical, political, and constitutional 
signing statements.15  President James Monroe issued what are 
considered by scholars to be the first two signing statements in 1819 and 
1822, respectively.16  Neither was issued contemporaneously with the 
signing of a bill, but both expressed Monroes intention to interpret an 
existing law to avoid unconstitutional interference with his Executive 
prerogatives.17  In 1830, President Andrew Jackson became responsible 
for the first two signing statements issued contemporaneously with the 
                                                     
 9. Christopher S. Kelley, The Significance of the Presidential Signing Statement, in 
EXECUTING THE CONSTITUTION 73, 75 (Christopher S. Kelley ed., 2006). 
 10. Id. at 74. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 14. CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS: 
REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 7273 (1998). 
 15. See id. at 7275. 
 16. Id. at 73 & 174 n.10. 
 17. Id. 
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signing of the bills to which they were directed.18  Congress has always 
resented this practicea fact illustrated well by an 1842 episode in 
which President John Tyler issued a rather timid signing statement 
expressing mild doubt about the validity of a portion of a bill dealing 
with the apportionment of congressional districts.19  A House Select 
Committee issued a sharp and lengthy protest authored by Tylers 
predecessor John Quincy Adams, denouncing the document as a 
defacement of the public records and archives and an evil example for 
the future.20 
Despite its deep roots in the nations history, the issuance of signing 
statements remained more or less anomalous well into the twentieth 
century.21  By 1950, however, the practice was commonplace.22  The 
average number of signing statements issued per year climbed steadily 
from almost sixteen during the Truman years to more than forty during 
Clintons tenure.23  Additionally, [c]oncurrent with the rise in the 
number of statements issued, the usage of signing statements to voice 
constitutional objections to acts of Congress has become increasingly 
prevalent over the past 60 years.24 
The Reagan Administration was the first to direct an orchestrated 
effort toward developing the signing statement as a strategic weapon to 
aggressively protect Executive prerogatives.25  One key aspect of this 
effort was an attempt to establish the signing statement as part of the 
legislative history of a law, and, in turn, to persuade courts to consider 
them when interpreting the meaning or constitutionality of statutes.26  In 
1986, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito, then serving as Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, drafted a 
memorandum in which he stated that a primary objective of the 
Litigation Strategy Working Group is to ensure that Presidential signing 
statements assume their rightful place in the interpretation of 
legislation.27  Alito argued that because the Presidents approval of a 
                                                     
 18. Id. at 73 & 174 n.11. 
 19. Kelley, supra note 9, at 75. 
 20. Id.; MAY, supra note 14, at 73 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 27-909, at 12 (1842)). 
 21. MAY, supra note 14, at 73. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 74. 
 24. T.J. Halstead, U.S. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Presidential 
Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional Implications, No. RL33667, Sept. 17, 2007, at 
23, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf [hereinafter CRS Report]. 
 25. Christopher S. Kelley, A Matter of Direction: The Reagan Administration, the Signing 
Statement, and the 1986 Westlaw Decision, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 283, 284 (2007). 
 26. CRS Report, supra note 24, at 3. 
 27. Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Atty Gen., to the Litigation 
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bill is just as important in the enactment process as that of the House or 
Senate, it seems to follow that the Presidents understanding of the bill 
should be just as important as that of Congress.28  In December of 1985, 
Attorney General Edwin Meese III wrote to the West Publishing 
Company, requesting that the text of presidential signing statements be 
included in United States Code Congressional and Administrative News 
(USCCAN) as part of the legislative history of the Acts of Congress.29  
Wests president agreed, adding that he was surprised nobody thought 
of it before.30 
During the Clinton Administration, the Office of Legal Counsel 
again produced memoranda supporting the issuance of signing 
statements, but this time asserted a presidential authority to use them as a 
device to announce an intention to refuse to enforce unconstitutional 
statutes.31  Interestingly, the first of these memoranda characterized the 
use of signing statements to create legislative history as much more 
controversial than their use to declare a statute unconstitutional and 
therefore unenforceable.32  A subsequent memorandum asserted that the 
President has an enhanced responsibility to resist unconstitutional 
provisions that encroach upon the constitutional power of the 
Presidency, yet nonetheless acknowledged that the Supreme Court 
plays a special role in resolving disputes about the constitutionality of 
enactments.33 
With this strategic groundwork in place, the stage was set for George 
W. Bush to make full use of signing statements to defend or expand 
Executive power by challenging provisions of statutes with perceived 
constitutional defects.  Since taking office, Bush has issued more than 
150 signing statementsabout twenty-two per yeara rate actually 
                                                                                                                       
Strategy Working Group (Feb. 5, 1986), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/ 
accession-060-89-269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Kelley, supra note 25, at 30405 (citing Letter from Edwin Meese III, U.S. Atty Gen., to 
Dwight D. Opperman, President & Chief Executive Officer, West Publg Co. (Dec. 13, 1985), 
available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/Acc060-89-269-box3 
-SG-ChronologicalFile.pdf). 
 30. Id. (quoting Letter from Dwight D. Opperman, President & Chief Executive Officer, West 
Publg Co., to Hon. Edwin Meese III, U.S. Atty Gen. (Dec. 26, 1985), available at http://www. 
archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/Acc060-89-269-box3-SG-
ChronologicalFile.pdf). 
 31. CRS Report, supra note 24, at 6. 
 32. The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 17 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131, 
131 (1993). 
 33. Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 199, 20001 (1994). 
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lower than that of his immediate predecessors.34  However, there are 
important qualitative differences between Bushs signing statements and 
those of other Presidents.  Bushs signing statements are typified by 
objections to multiple provisions of each new law, bringing his total 
number of challenges to discrete provisions of law to more than 1000.35  
Additionally, Bushs signing statements are much more likely to 
challenge laws on a constitutional basis.  Almost 78% of Bushs signing 
statements contain a constitutional objection,36 compared with 18% 
during the Clinton Administration,37 54% during the George H.W. Bush 
Administration, and 35% during the Reagan Administration.38 
B. Controversy 
Despite all of this activity, the signing statement went largely 
unnoticed by Congress and the general public until it was thrust into the 
national spotlight in April of 2006 when a front-page Boston Globe 
article asserted that President Bush had quietly claimed the authority to 
disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he took office.39  This story 
sparked a national controversy, fueled by an already-widespread belief 
that the Bush administration had taken extreme positions on executive 
authority in its legal defense of its war-on-terror policies.40  The article 
also highlighted Alitos signing statement memorandum,41 which had 
surfaced during his Senate confirmation hearings earlier that year, thus 
implicating the Supreme Court in the turmoil.42  Adding to the suspicion 
of a disturbance in the constitutional separation of powers was the fact 
                                                     
 34. President Clinton issued 381 (47.6 per year), President George H.W. Bush issued 228 (57 
per year), and President Reagan issued 250 (31.3 per year).  CRS Report, supra note 24, at 3, 56, 9. 
 35. Id. at 9. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 6. 
 38. MAY, supra note 14, at 74. 
 39. Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1.  
Savage was later awarded the 2007 Pulitzer Prize for National Reporting for this story.  David 
Mehegan, Globe Writer Wins Pulitzer for National Reporting, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 17, 2007, at 
A1. 
 40. Bradley & Posner, supra note 8, at 309.  See, e.g., Editorial, History Lesson: A Forgotten 
Injustice Echoes Today, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 4, 2006, at B8 (claiming Bush will do what he 
wants and call it legal); Susan Page, Power Play: Congress Pushing Back Against Bushs 
Expansion of Presidential Authority, USA TODAY, June 6, 2006, at 1A (Congress and the courts are 
beginning to push back against what has been the greatest expansion of presidential powers in a 
generation or more); Editorial, Veto? Who Needs a Veto?, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2006, at A22 
(arguing that Bush placed his imperial vision of the presidency over the will of Americas elected 
lawmakers). 
 41. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 42. Savage, supra note 39. 
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that President Bush, at that time, had yet to exercise his veto power
becoming the first President in modern history to serve an entire term 
without doing so.43  Had the President abandoned the veto in favor of a 
more powerful tool in the signing statement? 
In June of 2006, the American Bar Association appointed a task 
force to provide a scholarly analysis of the utility of presidential signing 
statements and how they comport with the Constitution and enacted 
law.44  The task force concluded that the issuance of signing statements 
claiming the Presidents authority to state the intention to disregard or 
decline to enforce all or part of a law he has signed, or to interpret such 
law in a manner inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress was 
contrary to the rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of 
powers.45  The report urged Congress to enact legislation to curb the 
Presidents issuance of signing statements and to enable members of 
Congress to seek judicial review in any instance in which the President 
expressed the intention to interpret a statutory provision in a manner 
inconsistent with congressional intent.46 
On June 27, 2006, Senator Patrick Leahy remarked before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that signing statements posed a grave threat to our 
constitutional system of checks and balances and that President Bush 
had used his signing statements as a de facto line-item veto to cherry-
pick which laws he will enforce in a manner not contemplated by our 
Constitution.47  Hearkening back to John Quincy Adamss hyperbolic 
assessment, Leahy further declared the signing statement a diabolical 
device which intrude[s] upon the legislative function and also upon the 
constitutional role of our courts.48  Several pieces of legislation have 
been proposed consistent with the ABA Task Forces recommendation, 
each attempting to regulate the practice in its own way, but none has yet 
been enacted.49 
                                                     
 43. Id. 
 44. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT: TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING 
STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 4 (2006), available at http://www. 
abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_signing_statements_recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf 
[hereinafter ABA REPORT]. 
 45. Id. at 5. 
 46. Id. at 1. 
 47. Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the Comm. on S. Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
(2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2007, H.R. 3045, S. 1747, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (prohibiting any court from relying upon or deferring to a signing statement as a source of 
authority and granting a congressional right to participate as amicus curiae in any action regarding 
the construction or constitutionality of any federal statute to which a signing statement was issued); 
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Such congressional disdain may be attributable to the fact that 
signing statements are commonly misconceived as a type of power to 
dispense with the law or an underhanded form of the unconstitutional 
line-item veto.  The Supreme Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act 
in Clinton v. City of New York as a violation of the Presentment Clause 
of the Constitution.50  The Act purported to confer upon the President the 
authority to cancel in whole certain spending line items of large 
appropriations bills.51  Although both Congress and the President desired 
this arrangement, the Court held that these line-item cancellations were 
tantamount to impermissibly conferring upon the Executive the 
congressional authority to amend or repeal statutes.52 
However, unlike line-item vetoes, signing statements have no 
binding legal force or effect.53  They have the same legal significance as 
other mechanisms the President could use to deliver the same message, 
such as a speech, a radio address, or an answer to a question at a press 
conference: none at all.54  Thus, although the enforcement intentions 
revealed in a signing statement may be problematic or even 
unconstitutional, the signing statement is not itself intrinsically unlawful.  
A recent Congressional Research Service report concluded the same, 
stating that [i]f an action taken by a President in fact contravenes legal 
or constitutional provisions, the illegality is not augmented or assuaged 
merely by the issuance of a signing statement.55  In this way, [t]he 
critics confuse the medium and the message.56  Furthermore, when the 
President signs a bill, all of it becomes positive law, notwithstanding the 
issuance of a signing statement declaring a portion of it unconstitutional 
and unenforceable as written.57  When a bill is signed into law, [i]t binds 
the conduct of the executive branch actors in the absence of a 
                                                                                                                       
Congressional Lawmaking Authority Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 264, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(prohibiting the use of funds made available to the Executive Office of the President from being used 
for producing, publishing, or disseminating signing statements); Presidential Signing Statements Act 
of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006) (conferring standing upon Congresss members to challenge 
signing statements in court); H.R.J. Res. 87, 109th Cong. (2006) (requiring the President to notify 
Congress anytime he issues a signing statement). 
 50. 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998). 
 51. Id. at 436. 
 52. See id. at 448. 
 53. John F. Cooney, Signing Statements: A Practical Analysis of the ABA Task Force Report, 
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 649 (2007). 
 54. Id. 
 55. CRS Report, supra note 24, at 15. 
 56. Bradley & Posner, supra note 8, at 362. 
 57. David Barron et al., Untangling the Debate on Signing Statements, GEORGETOWN LAW 
FACULTY BLOG, July 31, 2006, http://www.gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown_university_law/2006/ 
07/thanks_to_the_p.html. 
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presidential directive not to enforce it, and it can and will be enforced by 
future Presidents who disagree with any signing statement issued by a 
predecessor.58 
Of course, it must be acknowledged that although signing statements 
lack any legally binding effect, they very well may carry implicit binding 
effect on Executive officials who, serving at the pleasure of the 
President, are likely to be especially attentive to White House statements 
relevant to their duties.  This idea is developed more fully later. 
It is frequently reported that President Bushs signing statements 
declare an intention to ignore or set aside a provision of law.59  However, 
after an exhaustive study, the Congressional Research Service found that 
in almost all instances where President Bush has raised a constitutional 
concern or objection, he has stated that he will construe the provision at 
issue in a manner that will avoid his concerns.60  In some 
statements, . . . President Bush has declared that he would comply with 
the provision at issue as a matter of comity.61  [I]t is exceedingly rare 
for a President to make a direct announcement that he will categorically 
refuse to enforce a provision he finds troublesome.62  A casual perusal 
through the signing statements issued by President Bush reveals a 
ubiquitous, repetitive refrain: the Executive branch shall construe.  
Whether intentionally or not, the Bush Administration appears to be 
couching constitutional objections in some semblance of the Judiciarys 
canon of constitutional avoidance.  A fuller inspection of this canon is 
helpful here. 
                                                     
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Opinion, End the Use of Signing Statements, THE HARVARD CRIMSON, Nov. 26, 
2007, available at http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=520930 (describing signing 
statements as a device by which the president instructs the executive branch to effectively ignore 
some parts of a bill); Charlie Savage, Bush Asserts Authority to Bypass Defense Act, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2008, at 1A (President Bush this week declared that he has the power to bypass 
four laws . . . .); Savage, supra note 39 (President Bush has quietly claimed the authority to 
disobey more that 750 laws . . . .); Editorial, The Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2008, at A22 
(Mr. Bush has issued hundreds of these insidious documents declaring that he had no intention of 
obeying a law that he had just signed.). 
 60. CRS Report, supra note 24, at 10. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 24. 
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III. THE AVOIDANCE CANON 
The canon of constitutional avoidance63 is a rule of judicial 
construction that holds that where a statute is susceptible of two 
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional 
questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, [a 
courts] duty is to adopt the latter.64  The avoidance canon has been 
repeatedly affirmed to the point that it has achieved rare status as a 
cardinal principle that is beyond debate.65  Virtually no Supreme 
Court Justice has ever voiced doubts about its legitimacy.66 
The avoidance canon is rooted primarily in prudential judicial 
restraint influenced by the principles of separation of powers and respect 
for the other branches of government.67  The Court has said that because 
Congress is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution, 
the Court is obliged to indulge any possible construction that avoids 
constitutional difficulties.68  Such deference is deemed necessary by the 
Court in order to ameliorate worries about the counter-majoritarian 
institution of judicial review which must occasionally reject the product 
of the democratic lawmaking process.69  In other words, the avoidance 
canon is designed to be an express acknowledgement of legislative 
supremacy within the lawmaking sphere.70 
Justice Breyer recently elaborated for the Court: The doctrine seeks in 
part to minimize disagreement between the branches by preserving 
congressional enactments that might otherwise founder on 
constitutional objections. . . . [T]he doctrine serve[s] [the] basic 
democratic function of maintaining a set of statutes that reflect, rather  
 
                                                     
 63. The canon of constitutional avoidance is sometimes also referred to as the doctrine of 
constitutional doubt.  For the purposes of this Comment, the terms are synonymous. 
 64. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 555 (2002) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Atty Gen. v. Del. & 
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)). 
 65. William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 831, 832 (2001) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999); 
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 
(1988)). 
 66. Id. at 833. 
 67. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 104748 
(1994). 
 68. Kelley, supra note 65, at 844 (quoting DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 84346. 
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than distort, the policy choices that elected representatives have 
made.71 
Nevertheless, the avoidance canon does not give a court the 
prerogative to ignore the legislative will;72 the Supreme Court has stated 
that [w]e cannot press statutory construction to the point of 
disingenuous evasion even to avoid a constitutional question.73  To put 
it plainly, if the statute at issue is not susceptible to a saving construction, 
only then will the Court rule on the constitutional issue.  Just how serious 
the constitutional problem must be before the avoidance canon is 
triggered, and just how plausible the saving construction must be after 
the canon has been employed, are questions which seem to be resolved 
pragmatically with each case. 
Although the Court often cites deference to Congress as justification 
for the avoidance canon, it is also mindful of the finality of its decisions.  
If the Court renders a final, binding conclusion as to constitutional 
interpretation each time it speaks on a constitutional issue, the arduous 
task of amending the Constitution may provide the only counter to the 
Courts ruling.74 
Critics of the avoidance canon have asserted that it does not always 
serve the underlying value of legislative supremacy.75  First, given the 
complexities of the legislative process, it might well be that Congress 
would want a statute to be construed in a manner that makes the 
constitutional question unavoidable.76  Thus, in this context, it is no act 
of deference to construe a statute in a manner contrary to the expressed 
legislative intent.  Second, in a related argument, critics complain that 
whenever the Court purports not to decide a constitutional question, it is 
in fact relying upon previously decided constitutional questions.77  In this 
way, the Legislature has a very difficult time challenging the Court to 
consider budging from static constitutional moorings. 
Whatever its shortcomings, the fact remains that the avoidance canon 
is a deeply entrenched judicial value in our system of checks and 
balances.  This Comment will argue that the framework of the avoidance 
                                                     
 71. Id. at 844 (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998)). 
 72. Commodity Futures Trading Commn v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986). 
 73. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985) (quoting George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. 
Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933)). 
 74. Kloppenberg, supra note 67, at 1036. 
 75. Kelley, supra note 65, at 846. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 860. 
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canon may be successfully transplanted to the Executive Branch in the 
vehicle of presidential signing statements where it may be used to inform 
enforcement decisions regarding constitutionally troublesome provisions 
of law.  Because the Executives constitutional interpretations do not 
share the binding finality of the judiciarys decisions, and because 
sufficient safeguards exist to prevent the canons abuse, the President 
may employ a more liberal application of the avoidance canon than may 
the courtsthat is, the President may more freely express constitutional 
doubt regarding statutes and may offer more creative saving 
interpretations which bear a more attenuated resemblance to the 
congressional intent.  This Comment will explore the institutional checks 
which prevent a President from misusing this device, as well as the 
institutional incentives in place for the President to use it with discipline 
and restraint.  Executive application of the avoidance canon in 
presidential signing statements allows the fullest constitutional 
implementation of the Acts of Congress while simultaneously affording 
the Executive the fullest control over its legitimate enforcement 
prerogatives. 
IV. THE BASIS FOR EXECUTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
The avoidance canon was developed by the judiciary as a prudential 
restraint on its exclusive province to say what the law is.78  
Nevertheless, Presidents often avoid constitutional problems, as they 
should, through their interpretation of ambiguous statutes or through the 
exercise of enforcement discretion.79  The question remains whether it is 
a desirable or legal practice for the President to interpret statutes to avoid 
constitutional difficulties when the statute unambiguously mandates the 
Executive to do or refrain from doing something.  There exists abundant 
academic debate regarding whether a President possesses the 
constitutional authority to decline to enforce, or enforce according to his 
own saving interpretation, a constitutionally defective statute that admits 
of no ambiguity or prosecutorial discretion.80  Professor Dawn Johnsen, 
constitutional scholar and former acting assistant attorney general for the 
Office of Legal Counsel, believes that most of the academic literature 
fairly and usefully can be described as following one of two approaches: 
mandatory enforcement or routine non-enforcement of constitutionally 
                                                     
 78. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 79. Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable 
Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 9 (2000). 
 80. Id. at 14. 
09 - CRABB FINAL.DOC 6/17/2008  9:25:38 PM 
2008] THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH SHALL CONSTRUE 723 
objectionable statutes.81  The following discussion will borrow her 
framework. 
A. Mandatory Enforcement Regardless of Constitutionality 
One approach to presidential non-enforcement interprets the 
Constitution as requiring the President to execute acts of Congress, 
unless directed otherwise by a court of law, even when the President 
believes a law violates the Constitution.82  This position is readily 
apparent in the report of the ABA Task Force on Signing Statements, 
which concluded that [b]ecause the take care obligation of the 
President requires him to faithfully execute all laws, his obligation is to 
veto bills he believes are unconstitutional.  He may not sign them into 
law and then emulate King James II by refusing to enforce them.83  
Christopher May, constitutional law scholar, has similarly likened 
presidential non-enforcement of laws under any circumstance as a 
resurrection of the suspending power, a royal prerogative that was 
abolished in England by the Bill of Rights of 1689 after centuries of 
struggle between Parliament and the Crown.84 
This position is grounded on a literal reading of the Take Care 
Clause of the Constitution, which provides that the President must take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.85  The Presentment Clause is 
similarly straightforward, providing that all bills, before becoming law, 
must be presented to the President, and [i]f he approve he shall sign it, 
but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it 
shall have originated.86  This clause goes on to qualify the Presidents 
veto by providing that it can be overridden by a two-thirds majority of 
both houses.87  Neither of these constitutional provisions seems to 
contemplate the possibility of a President signing a bill and then refusing 
to enforce it or enforcing it according to an interpretation saving it from 
perceived constitutional doubt. 
Proponents of the mandatory enforcement view find support in 
various statements by the Supreme Court.  In Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
                                                     
 81. Id.  Professor Johnsen adds the caveat that she is not exhaustively addressing all views or 
some significant subtleties in views.  Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. ABA REPORT, supra note 44, at 19. 
 84. MAY, supra note 14, at 153.  The suspending power was an exercise of royal authority to 
suspend the execution of a law without the consent of Parliament. 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 87. Id. 
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Co. v. Sawyer, also known as the Steel Seizure case, the Court wrote that 
the Presidents power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes 
the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.  The Constitution limits his 
functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he 
thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.88  Similarly, in 
holding the line-item veto unconstitutional, the Court in Clinton v. City 
of New York stated that [o]ur first President understood the text of the 
Presentment Clause as requiring that he either approve all the parts of a 
Bill, or reject it in toto.89 
While compelling, neither of the above statements was essential to 
the holding, and are best viewed as dicta.  The only federal appellate 
court to squarely consider the legitimacy of presidential non-enforcement 
based on a perceived constitutional defect was the Ninth Circuit in Lear 
Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman.90  There, the court found that President Reagans 
asserted authority to decline to enforce provisions of the Competition in 
Contracting Act on constitutional grounds was tantamount to a de facto 
line item veto.91  The court further found that by refusing to enforce 
the provision at issue, the President unconstitutionally assumed the 
power of judicial review, a role constitutionally assigned to the judicial 
branch.92 
Despite this rather clear rationale, Presidents of both parties have 
consistently taken the position that where a statute is unconstitutional, it 
is the Presidents prerogativeperhaps even his dutyto refuse to 
enforce it.93 
B. Routine Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Troublesome Law 
At the other end of the spectrum is the position that Presidents 
should routinely refuse to enforce any statute with constitutional defects.  
This approach acknowledges that the Take Care Clause requires the 
President to ensure the faithful execution of the laws, but emphasizes that 
the Constitution is among the laws that the President is bound to 
                                                     
 88. 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
 89. 524 U.S. 417, 440 (1998) (quoting 33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (J. 
Fitzgerald ed., 1940)). 
 90. Johnsen, supra note 79, at 1415 (citing Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th 
Cir. 1988), withdrawn in part on other grounds, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per 
curiam)). 
 91. Id. at 15 (citing Lear Siegler, Inc., 842 F.2d at 1124). 
 92. Id. (citing Lear Siegler, Inc., 842 F.2d at 1125). 
 93. Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and the Presidents Authority to Refuse to Enforce the 
Law, ADVANCE, Spring 2007, at 5, 7, available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/2965. 
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faithfully execute.94  Proponents of this view find support in the 
Supremacy Clause, which provides that the Constitution shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land,95 thereby trumping any law in conflict with 
it.  When read together with the Presidents constitutionally prescribed 
oath to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution,96 proponents 
conclude that the proper Executive resolution of a conflict between a 
statute and the Constitution is that [t]he President must heed and 
execute the Constitution, the supreme law of our Nation.  Indeed, an 
unconstitutional statute . . . is simply not a law at all, and therefore 
cannot be one of the Laws that the President must faithfully 
execute.97  Thus, the argument goes, [f]or a President to choose to 
enforce a statute he believed was unconstitutional would constitute a 
dereliction of his constitutional obligation.98 
This view has deep historical roots.  President Thomas Jefferson, for 
example, offered the following explanation for his choice to order the 
cessation of all prosecutions and to pardon all of those convicted under 
the Sedition Act: the opinion which give to the judges the right to 
decide what laws are constitutional, and what are not, not only for 
themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the Legislature & 
Executive also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic 
branch.99  The Supreme Court finally confirmed the unconstitutionality 
of the Sedition Act 163 years later.100  Judge Frank Easterbrook of the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals argues that President Jefferson 
correctly 
contended that no law may go into force unless all three branches agree 
that it is constitutional.  Each, acting within its sphere, has the power to 
say no: Congress not to enact, the President not to approve in his  
 
                                                     
 94. Johnsen, supra note 79, at 16. 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
 97. Johnsen, supra note 79, at 17 (quoting Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of 
Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 18, 32 (1992)). 
 98. Id. at 19. 
 99. Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 909 (1990) 
(quoting 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 31011 (P. Ford ed., 1897) (letter to Abigail 
Adams dated Sept. 11, 1804)). 
 100. Barron et al., supra note 57.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) 
(Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried 
the day in the court of history.  Fines levied in its prosecution were repaid by Act of Congress on the 
ground that it was unconstitutional.). 
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legislative role or enforce in his executive role, and the Court to set 
aside.101 
Easterbrook sums up his view of the Executives enforcement power 
in this way: [t]o apply the rules includes the power to interpret them.102  
These views are largely premised on the political theory of 
departmentalism or coordinancy enunciated in Federalist No. 49, which 
generally holds that all three branches are equally charged with the 
responsibility to interpret and uphold the Constitution.103 
This position finds support in a number of Supreme Court statements 
as well.  In Myers v. United States, President Wilson had defied the 
Tenure in Office Act prohibiting him from removing postmasters without 
Senate approval.104  Although President Wilson believed the statute to be 
unconstitutional, there was no Supreme Court precedent on point at the 
time he acted to support his view.105  Interestingly, the House had 
impeached (and the Senate had come within one vote of convicting) 
President Andrew Johnson some sixty years earlier for violating the same 
statute.106  The Court ultimately struck down the Act as an 
unconstitutional encroachment of the Executives removal powers.107  In 
the opinion, no member of the Court . . . suggested that Wilson 
overstepped his constitutional authorityor even acted improperlyby 
refusing to comply with a statute he believed was unconstitutional.108  
Furthermore, had Wilson followed the mandatory enforcement approach 
by obtaining Senate approval before terminating the postmaster, there 
would have been no basis for the Myers lawsuit and thus no opportunity 
for judicial review and invalidation of this unconstitutional Act.109 
The Court in INS v. Chadha110 acknowledged with apparent approval 
the not uncommon practice of Presidents approving and later 
challenging legislation containing parts which are objectionable on 
                                                     
 101. Easterbrook, supra note 99, at 910. 
 102. Id. at 914. 
 103. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison). 
 104. 272 U.S. 52, 10708 (1926). 
 105. Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, supra note 33, at 
201. 
 106. Johnsen, supra note 79, at 8. 
 107. Myers, 272 U.S. at 176. 
 108. Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, supra note 33, at 
201. 
 109. Kinkopf, supra note 93, at 7. 
 110. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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constitutional grounds.111  The Chadha court invalidated as 
unconstitutional the congressional practice of enacting legislative veto 
provisionsprovisions requiring single-House or committee approval of 
Executive agency promulgationsafter no fewer than eleven Presidents 
had gone on record challenging the practice.  In a similar statement in 
Freytag v. Commissioner, four Justices agreed in a concurrence by 
Justice Scalia that the Constitution provided the President with various 
means to resist legislative encroachment, including the power to veto 
encroaching laws . . . or even to disregard them when they are 
unconstitutional.112 
Although these statements lend credence to the assertion that a 
President may decline to enforce a constitutionally objectionable statute, 
they beg the question: why not instead use the traditionally contemplated 
power of the veto in order to avoid the problem altogether?  One 
explanation is that a President may sometimes be faced with a statute he 
believes to be unconstitutional but which he did not have an opportunity 
to veto because it predates his presidency.  Another possibility is that a 
statute may seem perfectly acceptable on its face, but an unusual scenario 
causes it to be unconstitutional in only a certain unforeseen application.  
A third, and significant, factor is the increasingly frequent enactment of 
omnibus legislation containing numerous unrelated provisions.113  This 
type of legislation makes it practically impossible for Presidents to veto 
provisions they find unconstitutional without sacrificing other 
unobjectionable and importanteven vitalprovisions.114  In this way, 
the Legislature has indirectly diminished the power of the veto.  For 
example, Congress has enacted hundreds of legislative vetoes since 
Chadha, and not even members of Congress expect the President to veto 
such legislation or to enforce the patently unconstitutional legislative 
veto provisions.115 
The primary difficulty with this position is that it assumes that the 
Presidents ability to interpret the Constitution is infallible, or at least 
superior to that of Congresss.  This conflicts with the generally held 
assumption that the passage of an act is a de facto congressional 
determination of its constitutionality.116  But because members of both 
                                                     
 111. Barron et al., supra note 57 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 942 n.13). 
 112. 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 113. Barron et al., supra note 57. 
 114. Johnsen, supra note 79, at 33. 
 115. Kinkopf, supra note 93, at 7 (citing Louis Fisher, U.S. Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress, Legislative Vetoes After Chadha, No. RS22132, May 2, 2005). 
 116. Johnsen, supra note 79, at 17. 
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branches are sworn to uphold the Constitution, a rigid framework 
whereby the President must either enforce all laws, regardless of 
constitutionality, or routinely refuse to enforce all laws of questionable 
constitutionality, is unworkable. 
C. A Middle Road: Executive Application of the Avoidance Canon 
Professor Johnsen concludes that [t]he President does not most 
faithfully execute the laws either by invariably refusing to enforce 
statutes based solely on his independent views of what the Constitution 
means or by enforcing all statutes regardless of their constitutional 
infirmities.117  Rather, Presidents confronted with the prospect of 
enforcing constitutionally objectionable laws should be guided by two 
principles.118  First, the President must enforce the laws in a manner that 
preserves and respects the integrity of the lawmaking process as set forth 
in Article I . . . .  Second, the Presidents non-enforcement decisions 
must promote not the Presidents own constitutional views in isolation, 
but the Constitution itself . . . .119  Disciplined Executive application of 
the time-honored avoidance canon, as discussed below, is an attractive 
middle road which satisfies both principles. 
V. APPLICATION OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON IN PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING 
STATEMENTS 
Signing statements are a natural device by which a President may 
express an intention to construe a statute so as to avoid constitutional 
infirmity.  Their non-binding nature provides flexibility to allow the 
statute to be enforced as written as long as a situation does not arise in 
which the constitutional defect is implicated.  Their public nature 
promotes dialogue and accountability.  The proper application of the 
avoidance canon in the Executive realm depends largely on the nature of 
the constitutional concern, particularly whether the statute encroaches 
into Executive authority. 
                                                     
 117. Id. at 22. 
 118. Id. at 29. 
 119. Id. 
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A. Addressing Institutional or Separation of Powers Concerns 
Despite well-settled Supreme Court precedent that legislative veto 
provisions violate the Presentment and Bicameralism Clauses of the 
Constitution, to this day a surprising number of statutes enacted by 
Congress attempt to require the approval of a congressional committee 
before execution of a law.120  Legislative veto provisions remain so 
common that they are one of the most frequent objections raised by 
President Bush in his signing statements.121  If the President is presented 
with one of these provisions alone, he would, and should, almost 
certainly veto it.  This would be the action most in conformity with the 
lawmaking process as set forth in Article I.  However, when a veto is 
impractical, as in the case of omnibus legislation, refusal to enforce such 
legislative provisions seems perfectly reasonable.  The Bush 
Administration typically handles legislative veto provisions in signing 
statements with language that construes the provision as requiring 
committee notification rather than approval before execution of a law.122  
In this way, the provision is given the fullest effect possible under the 
Constitution rather than simply being ignored.  The legislative committee 
members receive at least the information they desire, and the Executive 
retains its prerogatives. 
However, most perceived encroachments into Executive authority 
have not been as squarely resolved by the Supreme Court as the 
legislative veto issue.  The President has a legitimate interest in seeing to 
it that he does not acquiesce in the unconstitutional erosion of Executive 
authority.  Presidential acquiescence to statutory provisions which 
intrude upon traditionally exclusive presidential domain (such as the 
removal power, the Commander-in-Chief authority, or the responsibility 
for directing the nations foreign affairs) may lead to undue difficulty in 
later restoring those powers.  The presumption of validity which applies 
to legislation generally is fortified by acquiescence continued through the 
years.123  Likewise, a universal and long-established tradition of 
prohibiting certain conduct creates a strong presumption that the 
prohibition is constitutional.124 
                                                     
 120. Hearing, supra note 47 (statement of Michelle Boardman, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General). 
 121. Id. 
 122. CRS Report, supra note 24, at 20. 
 123. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566, 572 (1934). 
 124. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 785 (2002). 
09 - CRABB FINAL.DOC 6/17/2008  9:25:38 PM 
730 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
The recognition that the President must uphold the Constitution and 
that an unconstitutional law is no law at all is, however, insufficient to 
establish presidential authority to disregard unconstitutional laws, for it 
begs a critical question: unconstitutional in whose view?125  In the 
absence of a clear Supreme Court pronouncement of the boundary 
between Legislative and Executive power, it does not appear that the 
Executive is in any better position to determine the constitutionality of a 
law than the presumably conscientious Congress which enacted it. 
This is precisely the reason that careful application of the avoidance 
canon is desirable.  Presidential compliance with a potentially 
encroaching law may be a dereliction of duties to the office.  Conversely, 
to entirely ignore the law violates the fundamental respect owed to the 
Legislature and the Article I process of enacting laws.  The President 
must articulate his constitutional objections in a manner that 
demonstrates an effort to promote a fair reading of the Constitution, and 
not simply the Presidents own constitutional views in isolation. 
President Bush has made steps in this direction by stating in his 
signing statements that he will construe troublesome statutes in such a 
way as to avoid constitutional difficulties.  However: 
[T]he large bulk of the signing statements the Bush II Administration 
has issued to date do not apply particularized constitutional rationales 
to specific scenarios, nor do they contain explicit, measurable refusals 
to enforce a law.  Instead, the statements make broad and largely 
hortatory assertions of executive authority that make it effectively 
impossible to ascertain what factors, if any, might lead to substantive 
constitutional or interpretive conflict in the implementation of an act.126 
President Bush and subsequent Presidents would benefit by 
developing language in each signing statement describing with 
specificity the Executive authority they believe is being threatened.  
Additionally, the signing statement should precisely and 
comprehensively describe the authoritys grounding in the Constitution 
or Supreme Court precedent.  The signing statement should describe with 
particularity the manner by which the offending statute violates these 
principles.  Finally, it should set out a plausible saving construction that 
conforms best to the original congressional intent for the statute. 
                                                     
 125. Johnsen, supra note 79, at 17. 
 126. CRS Report, supra note 24, at 11. 
09 - CRABB FINAL.DOC 6/17/2008  9:25:38 PM 
2008] THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH SHALL CONSTRUE 731 
The President should be mindful of the possibility of justiciability127 
whenever construing a statute in this way, with a strong preference for 
taking the action that makes judicial review most likely.  [J]udicial 
review of statutes generally fosters better constitutional outcomes and is 
more consistent with the constitutional allocation of lawmaking 
powers.128  For example, compliance with a legislative veto provision, 
although against Executive policy, provided a justiciable case or 
controversy allowing judicial review in Chadha.  Conversely, non-
compliance with the Tenure in Office Act as an intrusion on the 
Presidents removal power provided a justiciable case or controversy 
making judicial review possible in Myers.  In either situation, the 
President creates opportunity for further dialogue among the branches 
in the context of litigation129 by avoiding constitutional doubt.  Because 
it is the exclusive province of the judiciary to say what the law is,130 
the President should seek out judicial review of potentially 
unconstitutional legislative encroachment whenever possible by taking 
the action that will most likely create a justiciable case or controversy. 
Still, [a] relatively small number of statutes will be nonjusticiable 
whether or not the President enforces them.131  Most of these situations 
involve the allocation of constitutional powers between the branches, 
particularly in the areas of foreign affairs and the Commander-in-Chief 
power where there is not likely to be an injured U.S. citizen with 
standing to sue for a violation of statutory or constitutional rights caused 
by the Executives enforcement choices.132  When barriers to judicial 
review prevent the courts from providing a check on constitutionally 
objectionable statutes, and litigation is unavailable as a forum for further 
dialogue, the President should play an enhanced role in protecting the 
constitutional structure and the public from the effects of 
unconstitutional laws.133  In other words, the risk of harm to the nation 
from enforcing unconstitutional laws is greater than the risk of harm to 
the balance of powers from disturbing the congressional prerogative. 
                                                     
 127. Justiciability is the quality of being suitable for adjudication by a court.  Courts commonly 
require a concrete case or controversy and proper standing to sue.  Courts usually will not issue 
advisory opinions, nor will they rule on political questions or on issues which are moot or not yet 
ripe.  See generally 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529 (2007). 
 128. Johnsen, supra note 79, at 48. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 131. Johnsen, supra note 79, at 49. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (emphasis added). 
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As mentioned previously, the President is not necessarily a more 
adept arbiter of constitutionality than Congress.  Because the President is 
susceptible to political pressures, there exists a risk that he might 
manipulate statutory construction to serve his own interests above the 
mandates of the Constitution.  But Congress is not left without powerful 
tools with which to check presidential abuses of this type. 
Congress has the power to subpoena Executive officials to testify 
regarding the implementation of laws at oversight hearings.134  Failure to 
appear may be rebuked with citations for contempt of Congress.135  
Besides being time-consuming, the hearings are also conducted publicly, 
forcing the Executive to think carefully about how it wishes to be 
portrayed to the public regarding its enforcement of the laws.  In order to 
preserve the separation of powers balance, Congress is duty-bound to use 
its oversight power to check potential Executive abuses of power.136  
Evidence indicates that Congress may have neglected this duty of 
oversight during the George W. Bush presidency to some extent; at least 
while the Republicans controlled Congress: Just one committee in the 
House of Representativesthe Government Reform Committee
issued 1,052 subpoenas to probe alleged misconduct by the Clinton 
Administration at a cost of over $35 million while the same committee 
issued just three subpoenas to the Bush Administration.137  Thus, if 
President Bush has indeed misused the signing statement to improperly 
aggrandize Executive power, a lapse of congressional attention may be at 
least partially to blame. 
A perhaps even more powerful congressional weapon is the carte 
blanche power of the purse.138  Congress may refuse, as it wishes, to 
enact appropriations bills or may withhold funding for a key Executive 
agency or department.139  The following anecdote illustrates an occasion 
when Congress exercised this very power to cause the Reagan  
 
                                                     
 134. Christopher S. Kelley, Whos at Fault Here? The Bush Administration, Presidential Power, 
and the Signing Statement, MSL L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 14, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=976235). 
 135. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2000).  See generally Morton Rosenberg & Todd B. Tatelman, U.S. 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Congresss Contempt Power: Law, History, 
Practice, and Procedure, No. RL34097, July 24, 2007, available at http://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/RL34097.pdf (analyzing the procedures associated with the congressional contempt 
power). 
 136. Kelley, supra note 134, at 14. 
 137. Id. (quoting Dana Milbank, Bushs Fumbles Spur New Talk of Oversight on the Hill, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 18, 2005, at A7). 
 138. Easterbrook, supra note 99, at 912. 
 139. Kelley, supra note 134, at 14. 
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Administration to back down from a position it had taken in a signing 
statement regarding the unconstitutionality of a statute: 
In 1984 the Reagan administration signed into law the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984, and in the signing statement, it objected to 
executive authority bestowed upon the Comptroller General, an agent 
of Congress.  A provision of the law, known as the Competition in 
Contracting Act, gave the Comptroller General the power to withhold 
appropriated money in government contracting if one party felt that it 
deserved to win a contract that it had lost.  In addition to the signing 
statement, the Justice Department issued a legal memorandum 
defending the presidents challenge, and sent notification to Congress 
that it would not defend the provision if it were challenged in the 
courts.  Furthermore, the OMB Director David Stockton sent out notice 
to all the heads of all the agencies instructing them to not act upon the 
invalid provision.  When the administration informed the Congress that 
it would not recognize the constitutional validity of the provision
even after a lower court ruled against itthe Congress responded by 
threatening to cut-off appropriations to the Department of Justice for 
FY 1986 and 1987.  The administration quickly backed down.140 
A motivated Congress can, in this way, leverage its power to cause 
the Executive Branch to concede or compromise some of its 
constitutional objections to laws. 
Finally, Congress may impeach and remove from office all who 
violate the Constitution, as Congress understands it.141  This action is 
best reserved as a last resort, but it is not unprecedented.  President 
Clinton was impeached for perjury and obstruction of justice, and 
President Andrew Johnson was impeached for violation of the Tenure of 
Office Act, which as previously discussed was later invalidated as 
unconstitutional.  Neither was convicted and removed from office, but 
needless to say, impeachment is a palpable deterrent to presidential abuse 
of power. 
It should be noted that it appears, historically, that these and other 
congressional checks on Executive power have generally served their 
purpose as it relates to presidential signing statements and Executive 
assertions of the authority to construe statutes.  Critics . . . are mistaken 
to equate presidential refusals to enforce constitutionally objectionable 
laws with a line-item veto or dispensing authority, on the reasoning that 
Presidents routinely will convert policy objections into constitutional 
                                                     
 140. Id. at 1415 (footnotes omitted).  See supra notes 9092 and accompanying text for more 
detail regarding the lower courts ruling on the legitimacy of the administrations position. 
 141. Easterbrook, supra note 99, at 912 (emphasis added). 
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arguments.142  On the contrary, [t]wo centuries of experience establish 
that the President, too, is capable of principled constitutional 
interpretation.  Presidents . . . have a long tradition of interpreting the 
Constitution . . . and much of the constitutional analysis is memorialized 
in written legal opinions of Attorneys General or the Office of Legal 
Counsel.143  In addition, an empirical study recently conducted by the 
Government Accountability Office found that the majority of a 
representative sample of the provisions of the 2006 appropriations acts to 
which President Bush attached a signing statement were enforced as 
written.144  Of the six that were identified as having not been enforced as 
written, three were provisions attempting to institute a legislative veto 
and one was enforced in 38 days rather than the 21 days as directed by 
the statute.145  Furthermore, the report stated that although some 
agencies did not execute the provisions as enacted, we cannot conclude 
that agency noncompliance was the result of the Presidents signing 
statements.146 
The President has a special duty to the Oval Office and to the 
Constitution to avoid acquiescing in the erosion of Executive authority.  
When faced with a statute that impermissibly encroaches on Executive 
prerogatives, to which a veto is impracticable, the President should 
employ the avoidance canon in a signing statement, announcing intent to 
construe the statute in a manner that will give it the fullest possible effect 
without violating the Constitution.  The President should pay special 
attention to the potential for judicial review, and endeavor to make that 
happen if at all possible.  In the event that judicial review is not likely or 
possible, Congress possesses a number of tools with which to check the 
President from manipulating his power to advance his own ambitions 
rather than an equitable understanding of the constitutional separation of 
powers. 
                                                     
 142. Johnsen, supra note 79, at 41.  The dispensing authority is another name for the suspending 
power discussed at supra note 84. 
 143. Id. at 40. 
 144. U.S. Government Accountability Office Report, Presidential Signing Statements 
Accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations Acts, No. B-308603, June 18, 2007, at 1, 1319, 
available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/308603.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report].  The 
Government Accountability Office is an independent, nonpartisan agency that helps Congress ensure 
the performance and accountability of the federal government. 
 145. Id. at 10. 
 146. Id. at 9. 
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B. Addressing Other Constitutional Concerns 
The President should follow a similar approach for constitutional 
concerns other than those grounded in separation of powers issues, such 
as individual rights or federalism.  Again, if the constitutional defect is 
clearly established by Supreme Court precedent, the President should 
either veto the bill or issue a detailed signing statement to announce the 
intent to construe it to avoid the defect, thereby affording the Legislature 
the fullest constitutional effectuation of its wishes. 
The enforcement of constitutionally defective statutes which do not 
implicate separation of powers concerns is much more likely to produce 
justiciable cases or controversies.147  In these situations, there will 
usually be an individual who is harmed by a deprivation of a 
constitutional or statutory right stemming from the Executives 
enforcement choices.  For example, if Congress passes an affirmative 
action statute, but the President chooses to enforce it so that it avoids 
perceived Equal Protection Clause violations, a would-be beneficiary of 
the law may have standing to sue for an injury resulting from the agency 
or entity failing to strictly comply with the statute as written.  Because of 
the greater likelihood of judicial review, in addition to the congressional 
checks previously discussed,148 the risk of presidential abuse of the 
avoidance canon in these sorts of situations is minimal. 
The rationale behind carefully issuing highly specific and detailed 
signing statements applies with equal force to constitutional challenges 
involving issues other than the separation of powers.  Signing statements 
such as this exhibit the fundamental respect owed the Congress in the 
Article I enactment process by requiring the President to demonstrate the 
legitimate constitutional moorings for his position.  At the same time, the 
President is able to exercise his own constitutional determinations 
regarding the laws which will affect the lives of Americans. 
Case or controversy requirements and restrictions against courts 
issuing advisory opinions do not, of course, apply to the executives 
internal constitutional decisionmaking, and presidents can better serve 
individual rights to the extent that they expressly stake out their 
constitutional commitments in general and in advance of any concrete 
controversy.149  Because of the lack of these familiar restrictions placed 
                                                     
 147. See Easterbrook, supra note 99, at 927 (discussing the live controversies and real cases 
that initiate constitutional review). 
 148. See supra notes 13441 and accompanying text (discussing the means by which Congress 
may influence Executive enforcement choices). 
 149. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 
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on the courts, the Executive possesses a particular institutional strength: 
the ability to reach out and tackle a problem, rather than wait for it to 
come knocking.150  It is thus desirable for the President to proactively 
wrestle with constitutional questions regarding statutes he signs, and 
challenge them using a presidential signing statement and the avoidance 
canon if need be.  In this way, the Executive can help prevent a 
constitutional violation from befalling a citizen without waiting for a 
definitive ruling from the Supreme Court. 
But constitutional violations do inevitably befall citizens, who 
inevitably bring civil rights actions against government actors.  Even 
here, the Supreme Courts qualified immunity jurisprudence should 
uniquely counsel Presidents to carefully craft precise signing statements 
when challenging the constitutionality of statutes which may impact 
individual rights.  The Court has held that government officials 
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability 
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.151 
When evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, a strict two-step rule 
of procedure applies such that [a] court . . . must first determine 
whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual 
constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that 
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.152  In 
other words, the court must determine the constitutionality of the statute 
in question before it can decide whether the government actor enjoys 
qualified immunity.  Thus, when Executive employment of the 
avoidance canon results in civil rights litigation, it may have the ironic 
effect of forcing the court to abandon its own traditional adherence to the 
avoidance canon in order to confront and decide the constitutionality of 
the statute in question.  The result would be more final judicial 
resolutions of constitutional questions, leading to more consistency and 
predictability in the law. 
Additionally, a well-articulated signing statement expressing 
plausible doubt about the constitutionality of the statutory right at issue 
may very well impact a courts determination of whether the right was 
clearly established at the time of the violation.  Even if the Executives 
                                                                                                                       
MICH. L. REV. 676, 745 (2005). 
 150. Id. at 755. 
 151. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 152. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 
(1999)). 
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position as expressed in the signing statement is ultimately rejected by 
the court, a strong argument will remain that the official was reasonably 
endeavoring to execute the law in a manner consistent with the 
Presidents interpretation of it, and thus that the right was not clearly 
established at the time the official acted.  The qualified immunity inquiry 
thus provides at least two incentivesmore frequent final adjudication 
of constitutional questions and more expansive qualified immunity 
protection for officialsencouraging the President to apply the 
avoidance canon in a principled, reasonable, and restrained fashion.  
General assertions of Executive authority and baseless constitutional 
challenges are not likely to persuade a court that the official reasonably 
relied upon the Presidents signing statement in executing the statute at 
issue in the way that she did. 
C. Implications of Application 
1. Remarkable Benefits  
The benefits of using presidential signing statements to employ the 
avoidance canon are many.  First, the practice encourages transparency 
and accountability within the Executive Branch.  The more the public 
understands what is at stake in executive constitutionalism, the more 
pressure it can bring to bear on the executive to do it fully and well.153  
In other words, if the Executive Branch is going to continue to 
selectively enforce statutes based on constitutional concernsas it has a 
long history of doingthen the practice should be exposed to as much 
light as possible.  That exposure will require the Executive to express its 
concerns in a way that is defensible in the balance of powers between the 
branches as well as in the public eye.  The measure of defensibility will 
be directly proportional to the precision and care with which the time-
honored avoidance canon is applied in the vehicle of publicly scrutinized 
presidential signing statements. 
Second, the practice is an appropriate, moderate defense against the 
erosion of Executive authority.  The President should, whenever 
possible, seek judicial review of statutes which intrude on Executive 
domain (such as legislative veto provisions or provisions infringing on 
the Presidents removal power, Commander-in-Chief authority, etc.) by 
taking the action most likely to set up a justiciable case or controversy.  
When judicial review is not possible, the President has a justifiable 
                                                     
 153. Pillard, supra note 149, at 750. 
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incentive to aggressively defend Executive prerogatives.  Careful 
application of the avoidance canon allows the President to achieve this 
end while simultaneously allowing Congress the fullest constitutional 
execution of its Acts.  It should be noted, however, that the Court has 
recently signaled a willingness to hear cases involving the most sensitive 
types of separation of powers disputes, assuming jurisdiction and 
standing are present under traditional Article III principles.154  Examples 
include some of the recent cases arising out of Guantánamo Bay, such as 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,155 which held that the President lacked authority 
to convene a military commission to try a Yemeni national under 
procedures that did not comply with the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice,156 and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,157 which rejected the Executive 
Branch argument that out of respect for separation of powers, . . . federal 
courts should not review the facts concerning individual cases of U.S. 
citizens held as enemy combatants, but should review only the legality of 
the overall detention scheme.158  In any event, regardless of 
justiciability, the Legislature is equipped with adequate tools to check 
any abuse or manipulation by the President.159 
Third, careful and thorough application of the avoidance canon may 
actually lead to increased opportunity for judicial review in individual 
rights situations due to the Supreme Courts unique qualified immunity 
jurisprudence.  If an Executive official asserts qualified immunity as a 
defense to a civil rights action, claiming that the law in question was not 
clearly established as evidenced by the plausible doubt expressed in a 
signing statement, the reviewing court will be forced to address the 
underlying constitutional concern, to the benefit of all. 
2. Dangers Are Mitigable 
Critics articulate a number of concerns regarding presidential signing 
statements and the Executive practice of enforcing constitutionally 
objectionable statutes based on a saving construction.  Among them is 
the possibility that courts will favor the Executive interpretation over 
congressional intent derived from legislative history when deciding the 
                                                     
 154. Cooney, supra note 53, at 666. 
 155. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 156. Cooney, supra note 53, at 666 n.44. 
 157. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 158. Cooney, supra note 53, at 666 n.44. 
 159. See supra notes 13441 and accompanying text (discussing the means by which Congress 
may influence Executive enforcement choices). 
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constitutionality of a statute.160  The argument generally avers that [t]o 
rely on the [signing] statements . . . would violate the Constitutions 
separation of powers doctrine by both giving the President the power to 
make law and by allowing the President to usurp the judiciarys role of 
interpreting statutory meaning.161 
One response to this perceived danger is that empirical evidence 
shows that signing statements are rarely cited in court opinions.162  An 
exhaustive search of all published federal cases from 1945 to May 2007 
found that only 137 federal court opinions cited or referred to 
presidential signing statements.163  When cited or referred to, they appear 
to have had little impact on judicial decisionmaking.164  Of the 137 
opinions, only five of those were Supreme Court opinions, and the 
signing statement was discussed only in the dissenting opinion of two of 
those five.165  Thus, empirical evidence strongly shows that courts have 
not been prone to cite presidential signing statements, let alone rely on 
them for interpretation of a statute.  Furthermore, commentators have 
noted that the Supreme Court, due to changing membership, has 
generally been moving away from honoring legislative history for the 
past two decades.166 
Although the argument is largely moot due to this empirical 
evidence, there remains a convincing rationale supporting the treatment 
of presidential signing statements as part of the legislative history of a 
statute.  Justice Frankfurter wrote [i]f the purpose of construction is the 
ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be 
excluded.167  The President in fact plays a significant constitutional role 
in the enactment of legislation, from recommending legislation168 to 
signing or vetoing the same.169  The Executive Branch typically is 
heavily involved in suggesting legislation and then carefully monitoring 
                                                     
 160. See Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations 
of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 363 
(1987). 
 161. Id. at 363. 
 162. GAO Report, supra note 144, at 11. 
 163. Id. at 37. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
597, 604 (2006). 
 167. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 
541 (1947). 
 168. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President shall recommend to Congress 
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient). 
 169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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it as it makes its way through the legislative process, attempting to inject 
input all along the way.170  This state of affairs has led at least one 
political commentator to suggest that the legislature is not the dominant 
influence in the legislative process.  The President is more influential.171  
The Second Circuit acknowledged the value of presidential involvement 
in enacting legislation in United States v. Story, writing that President 
Reagans views are significant here because the Executive Branch 
participated in the negotiation of the compromise legislation.172 
Admittedly, Executive proposal and monitoring of legislation occurs 
at a much earlier stage of the legislative process than enactment.  But, 
because a bill cannot become law without the Presidents signature 
(absent an overridden veto), it stands to reason that his understanding of 
the law at signing is significant.  His involvement in the process means 
that he may be as familiar with the bill as anyone in Congress.  And his 
understanding of the statute is also likely to be informed by real-world 
enforcement expertise.  Both of these factors make the Presidents views 
of a bill at signing at least relevant to a Courts interpretation of 
constitutionality.  The potential for manipulation is checked by 
Congresss previously mentioned tools, such as oversight, 
appropriations, and impeachment.173 
A second perceived danger regarding the practice of signing 
statements and Executive construction of statutes is that the President 
will abandon the veto in favor of this new device, disrupting the 
separation of powers and the venerated system of checks and balances.174 
Again, this concern can be quieted with empirical evidence.  First, 
the GAO study that concluded that most of the 2006 appropriations 
provisions are being enforced as written notwithstanding the issuance of 
signing statements is illustrative of the fact that signing statements do not 
constitute some kind of mad Executive power grab.175  Second, as 
discussed previously, the signing statement has no intrinsically legally 
binding effect.176  If the President vehemently disfavored a piece of 
legislation, believing it to be poor policy, his better option would be the 
                                                     
 170. Kathryn Marie Dessayer, Note, The First Word: The Presidents Place in Legislative 
History, 89 MICH. L. REV. 399, 40607 (1990). 
 171. Id. at 408 (quoting ARTHUR MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 15 (1983)). 
 172. 891 F.2d 988, 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 173. Supra notes 13441 and accompanying text. 
 174. See ABA REPORT, supra note 44, at 1 (opposing the issuance of signing statements as 
contrary to our constitutional system of separation of powers); Savage, supra note 39 (reporting 
that signing statements skirt the constitutional system of checks and balances). 
 175. Supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 176. Supra notes 5358 and accompanying text. 
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traditional veto which would keep it off the books not only during his 
presidency, but permanently.  Furthermore, in no case should a President 
issue a signing statement outlining an intention to construe a statute to 
conform simply to his policy preferences.  Such a situation would indeed 
violate the constitutional system of separation of powers. 
The signing statement employing the avoidance canon indeed 
represents a new tool which may be used by Presidents to achieve their 
objectives.  However, the acquisition of new devices such as this one is 
not unique to the George W. Bush presidency.  Presidential scholar Ryan 
Barilleaux argues that pushing at the ambiguous and vague boundaries of 
Article II is what Presidents must do in order to keep up with their many 
urgent and evolving responsibilities.177  He calls this behavior Venture 
Constitutionalism, defined as an assertion of constitutional legitimacy 
for presidential actions that do not conform to settled understandings of 
the Presidents constitutional authority.178  For example, Thomas 
Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory when there was no clear 
understanding of how the country might acquire new territory, Abraham 
Lincoln asserted unprecedented powers during an unprecedented Civil 
War, and Jimmy Carter asserted the unilateral authority to terminate a 
treaty in force, an action later upheld in Goldwater v. Carter.179 
The actions tend to fall into one of three categories: actions designed to 
protect the presidents institutional interests such as Andrew Jacksons 
refusal to acknowledge the validity of the Tenure in Office Act; actions 
designed to promote national security and the advancement of our 
national interests, such as the actions Lincoln took during the Civil 
War; and finally actions designed to help the president shape policy.180 
The only thing that limits a venturing president is the Congress, 
which has the institutional capacity and resources to take on the most 
aggressive of presidents.  But it has to muster the will to do so.181  If the 
avoidance canon is carefully applied within presidential signing 
statements, there is little opportunity for abuse or manipulation because 
sufficient congressional checks are in place. 
                                                     
 177. Ryan J. Barilleaux, Venture Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of the Presidency, in 
EXECUTING THE CONSTITUTION 37, 40 (Christopher S. Kelley ed., 2006). 
 178. Id. at 42. 
 179. Id. at 4446. 
 180. Kelley, supra note 134, at 2021 (citing Barilleaux, supra note 177, at 44). 
 181. Id. at 21. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Executive employment of the avoidance canon in presidential 
signing statements is a useful tool for the protection of legitimate 
Executive prerogatives.  Additionally, when carefully applied, it may 
lead to more opportunity for judicial review of constitutional questions, 
leading to more consistent and predictable law.  Out of appropriate 
deference to the Legislature, when the veto is wholly impractical, the 
President should construe statutes to avoid constitutional peril, thereby 
affording Congress the fullest constitutional enforcement of the law. 
Presidents must also keep in mind that application of the avoidance 
canon to the Acts of Congress may not be the most politically expedient 
decision.  President Bush is still suffering fallout from the signing 
statement attached to the McCain Amendment prohibiting the cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees.  President Bushs use of 
signing statements has even become an issue in the 2008 presidential 
campaign rhetoric.  Senator John McCain has promised that he would 
never issue a signing statement,182  Senator Hillary Clinton conceded 
that she might in very rare instances attach a signing statement to 
provisions that contradict the Constitution,183 and Senator Barack 
Obama has argued that [n]o one doubts that it is appropriate to use 
signing statements to protect a presidents constitutional prerogatives; 
unfortunately, the Bush administration has gone much further than 
that.184  These statements clearly support the notion that although the 
President may have a legitimate constitutional separation of powers 
concern with any given statute, preserving political goodwill with 
Congress may often be the more strategically sound move. 
With sufficient congressional checks and safeguards in place, 
Presidents may successfully and accountably borrow the judiciarys 
avoidance canon to construe the Acts of Congress in a manner that 
comports with the Executive interpretation of the Constitution.  Congress 
is equipped with powerful tools, such as oversight, appropriations, and 
impeachment, with which to encourage the Executive to remain faithful 
to congressional intent when judicial review of Executive enforcement or 
non-enforcement is not possible.  And when Executive interpretation and 
enforcement choices impact American citizens and lead to civil rights 
                                                     
 182. Charlie Savage & James W. Pindell, A Tactic of Bushs on Bills is Assailed, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Nov. 20, 2007, at 14A. 
 183. Charlie Savage, Candidates on Executive Power: A Full Spectrum, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 
22, 2007, at 1A. 
 184. Id. 
09 - CRABB FINAL.DOC 6/17/2008  9:25:38 PM 
2008] THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH SHALL CONSTRUE 743 
litigation, the peculiarities of qualified immunity jurisprudence will 
require final judicial resolution of the constitutional disagreement 
between Congress and the President.  In this way, Executive application 
of the avoidance canon in presidential signing statements is a reasonable 
and observable method by which Presidents may best fulfill their 
obligations to execute the law and uphold the Constitution, while 
simultaneously allowing Congress the greatest effectuation of its Acts as 
constitutionally permissible. 
 
